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TED L. STEIN ON THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL-SCHOLARSHIP PAR EXCELLENCE
Mark B. Feldman*
I.

IN MEMORIAM

I am fortunate to have known Ted Stein as professional colleague and
friend during his years at the Office of the Legal Adviser, where he was one
of the brightest of a very bright group of young staff attorneys. His analysis
of legal problems relating to the conduct of United States foreign relations
was always original and helpful, and his contribution was beyond his years.
We have been deprived of a great deal by Ted's untimely death, but the work
he was able to accomplish in so short a time was extraordinary.
In the pages that follow, I would like to recognize one of Stein's works
that is particularly impressive-his 1984 article on the Iranian-forum
clause decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. I The special appeal of
Ted's scholarship was his ability to synthesize traditional analysis of text
and negotiating history with a practical appreciation of the diplomatic and
political characteristics of the process of international arbitration. The
article is a model for all legal scholars of thoroughness, clarity, and
objectivity.
II.

THE ISSUE

The issue before the Tribunal in the forum clause cases was whether the
Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States and Iran2 gave the
Tribunal jurisdiction to decide claims of American nationals arising under
contracts made with Iranian entities that provided, in one form of words or
another, for dispute settlement by the courts of Iran. The power of the two
governments to supersede the contract clauses in question was not disputed. The sole question was the scope of the intergovernmental agreement.

* Mr. Feldman is a partner at the Washington office of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine. As Deputy
Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, 1974-1981, he was a principal draftsman of the United
States-Iran Claims Settlement Agreement.
1. Stein, JurisprudenceandJurists' Prudence: The Iranian-ForumClause Decisions of the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
2. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Iran, reprintedin 75 AM. J. INT'L. L. 422 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration].
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This was one of the few issues that was articulated in the negotiation of
the Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States Government
and the Algerian officials that mediated the hostage-release negotiations
with Iran. From an early stage in the fall of 1980, the Algerians indicated
that Iran wanted to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal contracts
that provided for the resolution of disputes by the courts of Iran. The
American negotiators consistently maintained that such an exclusion was
unacceptable to the United States and was not in Iran's interest. They
explained that Iran could not achieve its objective of terminating the
contract litigation in the United States courts unless the claimants were
provided an alternative forum in the Tribunal, and asserted that the United
States courts would not defer to the courts of Iran and the President could
not compel them to do so. Ultimately, the two sides agreed to leave it to the
Tribunal to determine the scope of its jurisdiction on the basis of the text of
3
the Claims Settlement Agreement.
Article II of the Agreement, as it appeared in early January, 198 1, gave
the Tribunal broad jurisdiction, with certain exceptions not material to this
issue, over all claims of nationals of one party against the other party that
"arise out of debts, contracts . . . expropriations or other measures
affecting property." 4 Further, Article V of the Agreement provided that:
"The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law,
applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and
international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into
account relevant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed
5
circumstances. "
The reference to "changed circumstances" in this text proposed by the
United States was included by its authors specifically to authorize the
Tribunal to disregard Iranian law that might give effect to an Iranian-forum
clause even if the contract specified, as many did, that Iranian law was the
proper law of the agreement. The cases supported the proposition that the
courts would not enforce a choice-of-forum clause where circumstances
had changed so much that a party could not have a fair hearing of its case in
the forum designated in the contract. 6 With the revolutionary conditions
prevailing in Iran and the violent anti-American feelings associated with

3. All of the negotiations were conducted by the United States and Iran through the good offices of
the Algerians. We do not know precisely what the Algerian intermediaries told the Iranians, and we may
never know.
4. Declaration, supra note 2, at 423.
5. Id. at 424.
6. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Ellingerv. Guinness, Mahon
& Co., [1939] 4 All E.R. 16 Ch.

Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
the hostage'taking, it was clear that no American claimant could have an
effective remedy in an Iranian court.
The issue became more complicated when the Iranian parliament (the
"Majlis") adopted a resolution on January 13, 1981, approving the hostage
release agreements with the stipulation that "differences which are to be
investigated by competent Iranian courts" be excluded from international
8
arbitration. 7 After a tense exchange of proposals and counterproposals,
the parties finally agreed in the last days of the negotiations to amend
Article II of the Claims Settlement Agreement to exclude "claims arising
under a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any
disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent
Iranian courts in response to the Majlis position." 9
The final words on this subject were exchanged between Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Algerian Foreign Minister Mohammed Benyahia at Algiers on January 15, 1981. The counterproposals
presented by the United States side had so altered the command of the
Majlis that the Foreign Minister deemed it necessary to specifically state
that this text was "in response to the Majlis position." 10
He also focused on the words "binding contract" that the United States
team relied upon to preserve the authority of the Tribunal, conferred by
Article V, to disregard a contract provision for dispute resolution in the
courts of Iran on the ground that conditions in Iran precluded an effective
remedy for American claimants in the courts of that country. As recounted
by former Legal Adviser Roberts B. Owen, "Benyahia asked Christopher
directly whether he would 'insist' on the inclusion of the word binding'he anticipated an Iranian objection-and Christopher said flatly that he
would." I
The United States negotiators were relieved when Iran accepted this
compromise language. They believed there were good legal reasons why
the Iranian-forum clauses in the contracts made by American claimants
with the Shah's government should not be enforced, and they considered
the phrase "binding contract" sufficient grounds for the Tribunal to address

7. It is not clear this action of the Majlis was required as a matter of Iranian law, and it was
unexpected by the United States negotiators.
8. See Stein, supra note 1, at 5-6.
9. Declaration, supra note 2, at 423.
10. Id.
11. Owen, The FinalNegotiation and Release in Algiers, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES INIRAN-THE
CONDUCT OF A CRisis 297, 319 (P. Kreisberg ed. 1985).
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the issue. 12 However, the negotiators also recognized the risk that an
international tribunal presided over by neutral third parties acceptable to
Iran would be reluctant to characterize the Iranian legal system as hopelessly unfair, however obvious the fact.
III.

THE TRIBUNAL DECISION

This concern proved to be well founded. By a majority of 7-2, the
Tribunal concluded that the Agreement did not confer upon it the competence to review the enforceability of Iranian-forum clauses in the contracts. 13 The Tribunal justified its conclusion by asserting, without citation
of any supporting authority or reasoning, a presumption of incompetence:
"It is not generally the task of this Tribunal, or of any arbitral tribunal, to
determine the enforceability of choice of forum clauses in contracts
...
" 14 The Tribunal concluded that the words "binding contract" were
too ambiguous to provide the "clear mandate" from the parties it deemed
necessary to address this issue. The word "binding" was deemed "redundant. "15
At the same time, the Tribunal took pains to limit the effect of its
decision upon the claimants as much as possible. It construed the words
"specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole
jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts" 16 so restrictively that many
claims that might have been excluded were allowed to proceed before the
Tribunal. The exclusion was held not to apply to clauses providing for
arbitration in Iran or for adjudication by "competent courts according to
Iranian law," because they did not specify Iranian courts. 17 Further, a claim
referring to "all disputes and differences between the two parties arising
out of the interpretation of the Contract or execution of the Works" was held
not to exclude the Tribunal's jurisdiction because it did not refer all disputes
to the Iranian courts. 18 Some of these decisions may be poor precedents for
12.

[W]e deliberately drafted the claims settlement declaration in such a way as to allow a U.S.

claimant an opportunity to try to persuade the proposed international arbitral tribunal that an
Iranian-courts clause should not be treated as binding (that is, that the tribunal should hear his
case), because the Iranian revolution had effectively destroyed the remedial mechanism to which
the parties had agreed.
Id.at 312.
13. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO, I Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 242 (1982). Two United States
appointed Judges dissented, Howard Holtzmann and Richard Mosk. Judge George Aldrich concurred.
14. Id. at 245.
15. Id. at 246.
16. Declaration, supra note 2, at 423 (emphasis added).
17. Stein, supra note 1, at 9-12.
18. Id.
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other cases, arising in more ordinary circumstances, where the scope of an
arbitration clause is at issue.
IV.

STEIN'S TREATMENT

Professor Ted Stein's assessment is that the Claims Settlement Agreement provided a sufficient basis for the Tribunal to determine whether the
Iranian-forum clauses of the claimants' contracts were binding to the extent
that they ousted the Tribunal of jurisdiction over claims based on the
contracts containing such clauses, and that the Tribunal's refusal to do so
was contrary to the weight of legal authority. 19 He also makes a convincing
the enforcement of such forum
case that international law would not require
20
clauses in the circumstances of this case.
The Tribunal's major premise-that arbitral tribunals generally are not
empowered to consider the enforceability of choice-of-forum clauses-is
peculiar, to say the least. It is widely recognized that arbitral tribunals are
competent to determine their own jurisdiction, and it follows that they may
decide any issue of law or fact necessary to exercise that authority. Article
21 of the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, which are adopted for the Tribunal by Article 111(2) of the
Claims Settlement Agreement, confirms that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall
have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction." 2'
As Stein points out: "The Claims Tribunal's assertion that it could not
'consider' the enforceability of Iranian forum clauses involves a fundamental paradox; the consequence of refusing to consider' enforceability is the
enforcement of those clauses by the Tribunal itself."22 However, Stein
carefully examines the reasons for the Tribunal's action, which it was
unable to articulate, and essentially approves of it. "For what it is then
worth, I regard the overall outcome reached .not as a dereliction of duty, but
part of
as a responsible, though costly, choice." 2 3 The most fascinating
24
Stein's article is the analysis that leads him to this conclusion.
He puts the question bluntly: "How is it that a tribunal composed of
highly competent individuals, further enlightened by the parties' presentations, can do so woeful a job?" 25 Drawing on the thesis developed by
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 12-16.
Id. at 18-25, 30-32.
15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 701, 709 (1976).
Stein, supra note 1, at 16-17.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 32-49.
Id. at 35.
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Professor Martin Shapiro in his 1981 book entitled Courts:A Comparative
and Political Analysis, Stein discusses the tendency of tribunals, and
particularly of arbitral tribunals, to legitimize their decisions by seeking to
elicit the consent of the losing party to the decision. The task facing the
Tribunal in this regard was extraordinary as Revolutionary Iran does not
subscribe to the most elementary norms accepted in the West. Thus, "the
Tribunal must in large measure create, rather than draw upon, a base of
respect for legal norms whose sources are regarded as secular and predomi26 Moreover,
nantly Western. ,,
Iran made it plain that
a complete repudiation of the Majlis position would give rise to substantial
difficulties . . .

It is difficult to imagine an argument whose acceptance

more obviously aligns a tribunal with one of the parties than does the
argument that the courts of the other party are so hopelessly biased or
inadequate that no one can in conscience be remitted to his remedies there. 27
Stein intimates, correctly in my view, that the Tribunal was concerned
that the decision sought by the United States, and supported by the
Agreement and relevant authority, could have driven Iran from the Tribunal. Such a breakdown of the arbitral process would not have prevented
adjudication of the claims, but it would have complicated enforcement of
the Tribunal's awards once the security account of a billion dollars was
exhausted. Stein confronts and rejects the notion that "the Tribunal was
simply cowed by threatening noises from one of the parties." 28 Rather, he
seems to conclude that "the need to elicit consent subsists and should be
expected to exert a powerful influence" on the behavior of all tribunals,
particularly in the circumstances of this case. 29 "The U.S. arguments
necessarily posed special risks to the stability of the triadic structure and
Iran's statements merely reinforced this fact." 30
It must be noted that Stein's ultimate assessment of the validity of the
Tribunal's approach is powerfully influenced by the perception, based on
the information available at the time, that "no claimant was in fact excluded
from the Tribunal. ",31
This leads Stein to speculate that "[a] majority of the
Tribunal's members may infact have accepted the UnitedStates arguments
both on the law and as appliedto thefacts." 32 Thus, he credits the Tribunal
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id. at 38-39. As Stein recognizes, the alternative argument made by the United States, that a
fundamental change of circumstances had occurred, did not require such a characterization of the
Iranian courts. Id. at 40-41.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 44 (emphasis in original).
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with a "richly mediated" solution 33 that "may not have involved any
34
compromise of the claimants' interests.",
As events developed, it appears more likely that a few of the claimants
were hurt, but not many. The best information available at this writing is
that the Tribunal has issued final awards dismissing a party's claims on
account of an Iranian-forum clause in seven cases. The issue has been
litigated in another twenty cases, in sixteen of which the Iranian objection
to the Tribunal's jurisdiction was clearly rejected. At least one of the seven
disappointed claimants, Dames & Moore, was able to achieve a settlement
35
by other means.
Another consideration, given great weight by Stein in his ultimate
assessment of these decisions, is the perception that the Tribunal acted with
awareness of a larger mission to facilitate the gradual normalization of
relations between Iran and'the United States and, ultimately, Iran's rein36
tegration into the international economy.
V. A PERSONAL COMMENT
I am impressed both by Stein's research and by his sophisticated analysis, which enrich our understanding of the process of international arbitration. This brief review does not do justice to either. However, unlike Stein, I
am not entirely reconciled to the Tribunal's decision.
There is no doubt Stein accurately describes how an arbitral tribunal can
be expected to act. Attorneys must advise their clients accordingly, and the
United States negotiators certainly understood the risks. However, there
remains a question whether the Tribunal properly understood its responsibilities. The arbitration process was established for the benefit of the
claimants, not for broader diplomatic objectives. The United States and
Iran contracted for a series of adjudications of particular cases in accordance with law, not for a more flexible process of accommodation of
national interests involving elements of third party diplomacy.
In order to release the hostages, the United States was required to shut
down the claimants' litigation in the United States courts. The Tribunal was
established as an alternative forum for their benefit. 37 The United States
33.

Id. at 42.

34. Id. at 45.
35. Interview with David Stewart, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment
Disputes, U.S. Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 11, 1986). The original Dames &
Moore case is cited infra note 37.
36. Stein, supra note 1, at 51-52.
37. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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draftsmen took great pains to construct a procedure that could function
without Iran's participation. Indeed, arguably the process would function
considerably better if Iran walked out. To the extent the Tribunal denied
any claim that was encompassed by the Claims Settlement Agreement in
order to encourage the normalization of relations between Iran and the
United States, the Tribunal assumed a responsibility that neither government intended it to have.
On the other hand, both governments will benefit greatly if Stein's hopes
for the Tribunal's work are borne out. Stein closes his article with the
thought that a final judgment on the wisdom of the Tribunal's decision can
only be made later, when we can see whether the Tribunal has made good
use of the "opportunity it has purchased so dearly to promote [these
38
objectives and] the growth of the law.",
Respect for the Tribunal reached a nadir on Labor Day, 1984, when two
of the Iranian judges physically assaulted one of their Swedish colleagues.
The Tribunal suspended its work for a few weeks, but the Iranian judges
were replaced in December 1984. The Tribunal has resumed its work under
new leadership, 39 and it is beginning to make progress on its cases in a
professional manner.
In 1985 the Tribunal held more than fifty prehearing conferences and
hearings. It rendered fifty final or partial awards and awarded more than
$86.3 million to successful United States claimants. At year's end, the
Tribunal had rendered a total of 189 final awards (including around thirty
settlements embodied in agreed awards), eighteen partial awards and fiftysix interim awards. More than forty percent of the "large" claims (above
$250,000) of United States nationals against Iran had been resolved, and
United States claimants had received more than $395 million from the
security account established under the Algiers Accords. 40
A number of substantial settlements and contested awards in recent
months have brought total disbursements from the security account to more
than $592 million. Iran is obligated by the hostage-release agreements to
replenish the security account "to maintain a minimum balance of $500
million" whenever the balance falls below that amount. 4 1 The first replenishment of $100 million was completed in mid 1986.
38. Stein, supra note I,at 52.
39. The current President of the Tribunal is Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel (W.Ger.). The other
third-party arbitrators are Prof. Michel Virally (Fr.) and Dr. Robert R. Briner (Switz.).
40. Interview with David Stewart, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and Investment
Disputes, U.S. Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 24, 1986). For adetailed review of the
earlier work of the Tribunal, see Stewart, The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: A Review of Developments
1983-84, in 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677 (1984).

41. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19.
1981, United States-Iran, para. 7, reprintedin 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 420 (1981).
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It is premature to make a final judgment on the success of the Claims
Settlement Agreement, but as of this writing the Tribunal is working well.
It has set an ambitious schedule for 1986, and if the present pace of
adjudication and settlement continues, the Tribunal may be able to dispose
of the "large" claims of United States nationals in two or three years.
Unfortunately, very little progress has been made on the 2795 "small"
claims originally filed, and there are substantial intergovernmental claims
that could strain the Tribunal's resources. 42 The most controversial matters
are the claims of dual nationals, persons with both American and Iranian
citizenship. Hopefully, the Tribunal will be equal to the challenge.

42.

Interview with David Stewart, supra note 40.
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